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Abstract
In his ambitious paper, Risse addresses many important topics ranging from very general is-
sues about what human rights are to quite specific questions about rights to work and leisure.
I comment on four themes arranged in order of decreasing generality: Risse’s understanding of
what human rights are, Risse’s suggestion that a conception of human rights should best be “basis-
driven,” Risse’s particular basis-driven conception of human rights, and Risse’s specific position
on human rights relating to labor and leisure.
What grounds can Risse give us for accepting his revisionist understanding of human rights as
membership rights, which is so dramatically at odds with fundamental fixed points that have been
taken for granted in human rights disputes over the last 60 years or so? If Risse has his way, then
the treatment of a human being by others raises human rights concerns only if she is a participant
in the global order and only if her treatment is a matter of international concern. It is obvious how
this understanding of human rights is welcome to those who seek to free their own conduct or
their country’s policies from human-rights constraints. Appealing to Risse’s understanding, they
will be able to block criticisms based on human rights by denying, for example, that the people
of the Gaza Strip are members of the global order or by denying that the torture of Burmese cit-
izens within Burma is a matter of international concern. For those whose human rights are in
jeopardy, Risse’s understanding of human rights could be a disaster. We should therefore examine
very closely the arguments he may yet produce for his understanding and, unless they are hugely
compelling, stick to the orthodox understanding of human rights as rights that all human beings
have against all other human agents.
KEYWORDS: comment, conception of human rights, basis-driven, Risse, labor rights, leisure
rights
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INTRODUCTION
In his ambitious paper, Risse addresses many important topics ranging from very 
general issues about what human rights are to quite speciﬁc questions about rights
to work and leisure.1  I comment on four themes arranged in order of decreasing 
generality: Risse’s understanding of what human rights are; Risse’s suggestion 
that a conception of human rights should best be “basis-driven”; Risse’s particular 
basis-driven conception of human rights; Risse’s speciﬁc position on human rights
relating to labor and leisure.
I. WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?
Risse asserts that we should “think of ‘human’ rights as rights individuals hold qua 
members of the global and political order that ipso facto, but contingently, includes 
everybody.”2  Human rights are then “membership rights” and “associative rights”:3 
rights had by all and only those included in the present global order in which their 
fate is substantially inﬂuenced by what happens outside their own society.
What is the status of Risse’s assertion?  On what basis are we to assess and 
possibly to accept it?  This question seems pressing because the assertion is highly 
unorthodox.  Very few people employing the human rights idiom would think that 
whether human rights are being violated in North Korea turns on whether North 
Korea is or is not part of the global order.  And although “the UDHR was passed 
when it barely started to make sense to talk about a global order,”4 its framers 
certainly believed that massive human rights violations had been committed by the 
axis powers in World War II.  Risse’s understanding of human rights as membership 
rights would be strongly rejected by the propagators of human rights—both early 
(Kant) and modern (framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5)—as 
well as by the present users of the human rights language to whom Risse ascribes 
human rights as a non-universal privilege.  It would be rejected as reactionary, 
as pulling us back to a world before human rights, a world in which even the 
most fundamental rights of individuals were thought to depend on these persons’ 
speciﬁc status—be it ascriptive (nationality, gender, race, ethnicity, caste, social
1 Mathias Risse, A Right to Work? A Right to Leisure? Labor Rights as Human Rights, 3 L. 
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2009).
2 Id. at 15-16.
3 Id. at 22.
4 Id. at 31.  
5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
1st. plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 71 (Dec. 12, 1948).  See JOHANNES MORSINK: THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999).
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rank, age, religion, etc.) or achieved (virtue, merit, desert, spiritual enlightenment, 
etc.).  The language of human rights was deliberately conceived to express the then 
revolutionary thought that there are some fundamental rights that all human beings 
have simply in virtue of being human.  Risse asks us to reverse this revolution by 
understanding human rights as membership rights.  Why should anyone accept his 
understanding of human rights?
It is possible that Risse’s assertion is not meant as the reactionary move 
it appears to be.  It is possible that the appearance is due to a simple conﬂation
on his part.  Risse appears to assert that we should ascribe human rights to all 
and only human beings included in the global order; but what he really means 
to assert is that a commitment to (truly universal) human rights is a condition of 
full membership in the present global order.  On this charitable interpretation, 
Risse is not a reactionary denier of the universality of human rights, but an astute 
observer of the non-universality of the appreciation of universal human rights. 
Such appreciation rhetorically is, and more substantively ought to become, central 
to international society, but is uncommon outside of its spatial and temporal 
boundaries.  So interpreted, Risse’s assertion is close to what many have advocated 
in one form or another—Rawls, for instance, when he suggests that peoples should 
have to honor human rights as a condition of being recognized as members in good 
standing in a Rawlsian Society of Peoples.  Rawls would never deny that persons 
outside this Society—oppressed nationals of contemporary or historical autocracies, 
for example—have human rights.  In fact, it is because such autocratic societies 
fail to honor the human rights of many of their individual inhabitants that Rawls 
disqualiﬁes them from membership in his Society of Peoples.
In my view, this is too obvious a distinction for Risse to have missed.  So I 
will spare him the “charity” of an anodyne reading and assume that he means what 
he says.  And my question then stands: What is the ground for his assertion?  What 
reason can he give us to follow him in understanding human rights as membership 
rights?  Is this understanding supposed to be implicit in how human rights are 
conceived in the international documents or by those of us who employ the human 
rights language?  Is there some philosophical reason why there can be no universal 
rights of the sort many have felt committed to in the last 60 years?  Are there some 
empirical-political worries that a widespread or ofﬁcial commitment to universal
human rights would somehow do more harm than good, be counterproductive? 
All these objections to universal human rights—and others—are familiar from the 
literature and could be adapted in defense of Risse’s proposed understanding of human 
rights as associative rights.  Some such defense is needed if we are to take seriously 
Risse’s challenge to the conventional understanding of human rights as universal. 
Some such defense would also be helpful for gaining a better understanding of 
whether Risse’s assertion is primarily normative (we ought to endorse membership 
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rights in preference to universal rights) or primarily hermeneutic (the most plausible 
reconstruction of current human-rights talk and practice understands human rights 
as membership rights), and whether this assertion is directed primarily at the legal 
or at the moral human rights discourse.
The assertion that human rights are membership rights tells us something, 
but not much, about what human rights are.  It tells us that the claim “there is a 
human right to X” is tantamount to the claim that members of the global order 
have some responsibilities with regard to other members’ having X.  But what are 
these responsibilities?  What conduct by what other members is one entitled to by 
having a membership right to X?  In touching upon this question of counterpart 
responsibilities, Risse casually endorses two common views about them:6  (A) The 
primary responsibility for the fulﬁllment of a person’s human rights rests with this
person’s state.  (B) Responsibilities for the fulﬁllment of human rights are unaffected
by the causal explanation for the human rights deﬁcit in question, except insofar
as the ascription of responsibility presupposes an ability to remedy the deﬁcit in
question (“ought implies can”).  I have criticized these views at length7 and would 
be curious to know why Risse ﬁnds them persuasive.
To see what is at stake here, consider massive human rights deﬁcits occurring
under a corrupt and oppressive junta that took power by force in an impoverished 
but resource-rich country, call it Quark, which participates in the global order.  In 
Scenario 1, the rules of this global order permit outsiders to make loans to the 
junta, to pay the junta for natural resources it exports, to sell arms to the junta, and 
to hold the personal fortunes of junta afﬁliates in secret bank accounts.  Foreign
corporations, banks, and governments in fact do all these things and thereby enable 
the junta to maintain itself in power even against the will of most of Quark’s 
population.  In Scenario 2, the rules of the global order contain effective provisions 
against making loans to illegitimate and oppressive regimes, against recognizing 
such regimes as entitled to sell the country’s resources, and against accepting corrupt 
monies for investment.  Nonetheless, the junta maintains itself in power through a 
system of indoctrination backed by brutal intimidation.8  Contrary to (B), I would 
think that the difference between these two scenarios makes a difference to the 
6 Id. at 31.
7 See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed. 2008).
8 It will be easier to see the point of these contrasting scenarios when one assumes that local 
conditions are different so that the junta in Scenario 1 would not have come to power, or could not 
maintain itself in power, without the support foreigners are legally permitted and disposed to provide 
to it through loans, resource purchases, and arms sales.  (This is not to deny that we also need to 
think about intermediate scenarios in which such available foreign support makes a non-necessary 
contribution to oppressive rule.)  See my Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of 
Negative Duties, 19 (1) ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 55, at 62-65 (2005).
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allocation of responsibilities: Contrary to (A), it would be implausible in Scenario 
1—but perhaps not in Scenario 2—to allocate primary responsibility for addressing 
the human rights deﬁcit to the junta and nationals of Quark.  To be sure, in both
scenarios the junta has a responsibility to mend its ways.  But the responsibilities 
of foreigners are much weightier in Scenario 1 where these foreigners are deeply 
implicated in the human rights deﬁcits suffered by Quark’s population.
These issues go to the heart of what human rights are, in this way: On my 
view, agents violate human rights only when they actively conduct themselves in 
ways that foreseeably and avoidably contribute to the frustration of fundamental 
human needs or interests.  This is what foreigners do in Scenario 1, but not in 
Scenario 2.  Foreigners in Scenario 2 thus have no human-rights-based obligations 
to intervene.  Risse does not make this distinction and takes human rights to oblige 
even mere bystanders who can alleviate a human rights deﬁcit: Unfulﬁlled human
rights impose secondary responsibilities on foreign states and their nationals no 
matter how this human rights deﬁcit may be caused.9  On the face of it, this appears to 
take human rights more seriously than I propose.  But Risse then avoids the burdens 
such responsibilities might impose on foreigners in other ways: by pointing out that 
it is often inopportune to intervene and by endorsing Sen’s lame contention that the 
human rights of others oblige an agent merely to some minimal consideration: “if 
one is in a plausible position to do something effective in preventing the violation 
of such a right, then one does have an obligation to consider doing just that.” 
The unfulﬁlled human rights of others “cannot simply be brushed away as ‘none
of one’s business.’”10  On the Sen-Risse view, foreign governments, banks, and 
corporations have done their duty when, in Scenario 1, they decide upon reﬂection
to do nothing toward protecting those oppressed by the junta.  In my view, such 
agents, continuing business as usual, are as much violators of the human rights of 
the abused population as the junta whose oppression they enable and incentivize.
II. THE IDEA OF A “BASIS-DRIVEN” CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Risse proposes that we think of a conception of human rights as consisting of four 
elements:11  First, a list of rights to be included; second, “an account of the basis 
on which individuals have them (an account of what features turn individuals into 
rights holders)”; third, a principle that provides the rationale for the list; and, fourth, 
9 Provided, of course that these foreigners are fellow-members of the global political 
order.
10 Risse, supra note 1, at  32, quoting Amartya Sen.
11 Id. at 16.
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an account of counterpart responsibilities.  He then distinguishes conceptions of 
human rights by the order in which they specify these four elements:12 There are 
list-driven conceptions that begin from a list and then try to construct a plausible 
rationale for this list.  There are basis-driven conceptions that begin by explaining 
in virtue of what those who have human rights have them.  And there are principle-
driven conceptions that start out from some principle that generates the list.  Risse 
acknowledges that the distinction between the last two types is not precise because 
basis and principle can be closely related.  Basis-driven conceptions work with a 
principle for identifying human rights, but one that is grounded in an account of 
what features turn individuals into rights holders.
I am not sure this categorization of conceptions of human rights is clear 
or helpful.  It is hard to see how any principle for identifying human rights could 
be un-based in any facts or values about human beings.  And it is then unclear 
what principles are sufﬁciently independent to count as “principle-driven” rather
than “basis-driven.”  Risse characterizes his own conception as “basis-driven, 
the basis being membership in the global political and economic order.”13  Yet he 
characterizes the conception Beitz develops out of Rawls as “assessing what ought 
to be the function of human rights in the global order” and therefore principle-
driven.14  I do not doubt that there is a way to make the distinction precise so that 
Risse and Beitz get categorized as Risse wants.  But it would be good to have this 
distinction drawn more clearly.
Another question is whether Risse’s tripartite distinction is meant to be 
exhaustive.  It is tempting to suggest that there can also be responsibilities-driven 
conceptions of human rights that begin from an account of what human beings (or, 
on Risse’s view, fellow members) minimally owe one another.  Onora O’Neill has 
discussed human rights along these lines,15 and Tim Scanlon’s work may provide 
another basis for such a conception.16
An even more important objection to Risse’s categorization is that we need 
not assign content priority to any of the four elements Risse usefully distinguishes. 
It makes more sense, in my view, to consider all four elements together: to gather 
our ﬁrmest convictions about each and then to try to unify them into a coherent
and uniﬁed conception.  This is the method Rawls calls “reﬂective equilibrium”:
12 Id. at17.
13 Id. at 21.
14 Id. at 18.
15 See, e.g., ONORA O’NEILL, FACES OF HUNGER: AN ESSAY ON POVERTY, JUSTICE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1986).  See also ONORA O’NEILL CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1989).
16 THOMAS MICHAEL SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE to EACH OTHER (1998).
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We have some ﬁrm convictions about what must be on the list but are doubtful
about other candidate human rights; we have some deﬁnite ideas about what sort
of beings have human rights but are unsure about certain borderline cases; we 
intuitively reject some possible principles for deciding which candidate human 
rights should be included and ﬁnd other such principles appealing; and we also have
some solid convictions about the plausibility or implausibility of the counterpart 
responsibilities various speciﬁcations of the other three elements would generate. 
Does it not make more sense, then, to aim for a conception of human rights that 
is not “driven” by any one of its elements but rather designed to be as plausible as 
possible across all its four elements?
III. RISSE’S SPECIFIC BASIS-DRIVEN CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Risse presents his own conception of human rights as basis-driven, that is, as driven 
by an account of what features turn individuals into rights holders.  On his account, 
there is one such feature: the individual’s membership in the global order.  This 
is a very thin basis which does not tell us anything further about human beings: 
about their needs, interest, vulnerabilities, and unique value.  It is hard to see how a 
“basis” that does not include such knowledge about human beings can be of much 
use for deciding which candidate human rights to include or exclude. 
When he sketches how to make such decisions, Risse in fact implicitly draws 
upon an account of human needs and interests.  Thus he writes that the inclusion 
of some candidate human rights on the list may be grounded in enlightened self-
interest.17  Such a grounding presupposes an account of human interests and 
their (rough) relative weights.  And similarly for his suggestion that, to qualify 
for inclusion, a candidate human right must express “an appropriate and urgent 
moral demand against authority.”18  Risse’s ofﬁcial basis gives us no ground to
make such assessments.  And Risse must and does then invoke ad hoc judgments, 
extraneous to his basis, when he qualiﬁes some demands against authority as urgent
or appropriate and others not.
IV. RISSE ON LABOR RIGHTS
Such improvisation is also apparent in Risse’s discussion of candidate labor rights. 
Early on he announces: “Asking the apparently straightforward question whether 
labor rights should be considered human rights takes us to the core of conceptual 
17 Risse, supra note 1, at 27.
18 Id. at 28.
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questions about human rights.”19  However, Risse’s treatment of those conceptual 
questions does not in the end inform or facilitate his discussion of labor rights.  He 
favors a human right to work, understood as a right to offer one’s services, rather 
than a right to have a work opportunity actually provided to one, if need be by 
the state.20  The argument Risse offers for qualifying this right as a human right is 
that “for most adults, paid work is the source of their livelihood, and they spend 
much of their time earning the money on which they must live and raise families. 
Employment is also a crucial source of self-esteem.”21  This argument is entirely 
extraneous to Risse’s conception of human rights.  And it supports including not the 
narrow right Risse favors: to offer one’s services, but the broader right Risse rejects: 
to have real access to some job.  That’s what people must have if employment 
really is, as Risse says, the source of livelihood and crucial to maintaining self-
esteem.  If, on the other hand, livelihood and self-esteem can also be maintained 
without employment—perhaps through a state-funded basic income that permits 
the unemployed to enjoy various other pursuits—then even Risse’s limited human 
right to employment should be rejected in favor of an even weaker, disjunctive 
human right to employment or a basic income.
Pursuant to his understanding of human rights as rights of membership 
in the global order, Risse requires that candidate human rights must also pass a 
second test:  They must be matters of “urgent global concern.”22  He claims that 
the limited right not to be legally excluded from employment passes this test in 
virtue of “enlightened self-interest and interconnectedness.”23  The idea seems to 
be that in a global order characterized by extensive international trade, people are 
affected by, and have an interest in, how labor is regulated in foreign lands.  Again, I 
don’t ﬁnd this argument convincing.  Suppose some country violated the candidate
human right Risse proposes by legally excluding a part of its own population from 
employment.  This country would thereby render its own economy less productive 
and would thus put itself at a competitive disadvantage against other countries 
relative to what its position would be without the restriction.  Is this a ground for 
other countries to have a legitimate interest in including the labor right Risse favors 
among the rights of membership in the global order?  Offhand, I cannot see why it 
should be.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Risse invokes the analogy to a right to marry, which is a right to offer marriage to others 
rather than a right to be provided with a suitable spouse, id. at 34. 
21 Id.
22 Id. at 34.
23 Id. at 30.
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This difﬁcultyabout labor rights suggestsamoregeneralproblemwithRisse’s
postulated second necessary qualifying condition for human-right status.  There are 
many paradigm human rights that—even more obviously than Risse’s favored labor 
right—fail to meet the second condition.  The right not to be tortured is an example. 
The fact that people are tortured in Burma does not affect the interests of people 
elsewhere.  And Risse’s understanding of human rights would then disqualify a 
human right against (domestic) torture.  This problem highlights once more the 
puzzlement I expressed in the middle paragraph of section 1 of this commentary: 
What grounds can Risse give us for accepting his revisionist understanding of 
human rights which is so dramatically at odds with fundamental ﬁxed points that
have been taken for granted in all the busy arguments and disputes about human 
rights over the last 60 years or so?  Why should we hijack an expression that, despite 
much dispute and contestation at the margins, has some ﬁrm and widely agreed-
upon meaning and use it for something very different?  I don’t see so much as a 
hint toward an answer in Risse’s paper.  But I see very clearly the great attraction 
his understanding of human rights might have for those who seek to free their own 
conduct or their country’s policies from human-rights constraints.  If Risse has his 
way, we’ll soon be obliged to spend time arguing that the people of the Gaza Strip 
are members of the global order and that torture is a matter of international concern 
even if it happens to Iraqis in Iraq or to Burmese in Burma.
Not looking forward to such debates, I suggest that we examine very closely 
the arguments Risse may produce for his understanding of human rights.  Unless 
they are hugely compelling, we should stick to the orthodox understanding of human 
rights as rights all human beings have against all other human agents.
